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Abstract
Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants
can influence the auction outcome to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations were
proven to be eliminated if and only if the market objective is supermodular. Nevertheless, sev-
eral auctions do not satisfy the stringent conditions for supermodularity. These auctions include
electricity markets, which are the main motivation of our study. To characterize nonsupermod-
ular functions, we introduce the supermodularity ratio and the weak supermodularity. We show
that these concepts provide us with tight bounds on the profitability of collusion and shill bid-
ding. We then derive an analytical lower bound on the supermodularity ratio. Our results are
verified with case studies based on the IEEE test systems.
1 Introduction
Over the last couple of decades, electricity markets have been undergoing a rapid transformation
from tightly regulated monopolies to deregulated competitive market structures [1]. This restruc-
turing has been essential to improve economic efficiency and attract new investments [2]. Designing
electricity markets is not a simple task since supply and demand of electricity need to be balanced
in every instance of time. Specifically, high penetration of intermittent renewable energy sources
presents challenges in maintaining this stability [3]. Hence, there has been a surge of interest from
the control community in studying various electricity markets [4–7].
This work studies a subset of the existing market mechanisms, conducted as reverse auctions. In
these markets, generators submit their bids, and then an independent system operator determines
the power allocation and the payment for each generator. The allocation rule is the economic
dispatch which secures a reliable operation. Then, the central element of the market design is
the payment rule, since the generators have incentives to strategize around it. In particular, the
operator designs the payment rule to ensure that the generators reveal their true costs in order to
achieve a stable grid with maximum social welfare [2].
Previous work on electricity markets considered the pay-as-bid [6] and the locational marginal
pricing mechanisms [8]. In both mechanisms, generators can bid strategically to influence their
profits since these mechanisms do not incentivize truthful bidding. Studies have shown that strate-
gic manipulations have increased electricity prices substantially in these markets [9, 10]. As an
alternative, under the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, truthful bidding is the dominant-
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strategy Nash equilibrium [11–13]. As a result, every generator finds it more profitable to reveal
their true costs, regardless of the bids of other generators. Due to this property, several recent
works proposed the use of the VCG mechanism in electricity markets [14,15].
Despite the desirable theoretical properties of the VCG mechanism, coalitions of generators can
strategically bid to increase their collective utility. Hence, this mechanism is susceptible to collusion
and shill bidding [16]. Because the same market participants are involved in similar transactions
day after day, electricity markets can be exposed to such manipulations [17]. This is crucial since
in a larger context the VCG mechanism is not truthful.
As is outlined in auction literature [16], collusion and shill bidding occur when the VCG outcome
is not in the core. The core is a concept from coalitional game theory where the participants have
no incentive to leave the coalition of all participants. As is proven in [7], the VCG outcomes lie in
the core if and only if the market objective is supermodular. Supermodularity can only be achieved
in restricted settings, such as polymatroid constraints and convex bids. Consequently, electricity
markets are generally not supermodular since technical rigidities result in complex constraint sets.
Our goal is to understand the properties of the VCG mechanism if the stringent conditions for
supermodularity do not hold. To identify the bottlenecks caused by strategic manipulations, we aim
to provide bounds on the profitability of collusion and shill bidding by defining the concept of weak
supermodularity. For this concept, we are inspired by the growing literature on the submodularity
ratio [18–20].
Our contributions in this paper are as follows. First, we introduce a new way to characterize
nonsupermodular set functions, that is, the supermodularity ratio. This ratio quantifies how close a
function is to being supermodular. Second, we show that the supermodularity ratio provides us with
tight bounds on the profitability of collusion and shill bidding under the VCG mechanism. Third,
we derive an analytical lower bound on the supermodularity ratio of the electricity markets under
consideration. Finally, we verify our results with case studies based on the IEEE test systems. The
results derived on collusion and shill bidding apply to general auctions run by the VCG mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work providing such bounds for VCG outcomes not
lying in the core.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the electricity
market and discuss the VCG mechanism. Section 3 defines the supermodularity ratio. First, we
obtain bounds on collusion and shill bidding, see Theorem 1. We then provide a lower bound on
the supermodularity ratio of the markets, see Theorem 2. In Section 4, we present the numerical
results.
2 Mechanism framework
We start with a generic electricity market reverse auction. The set of participants consists of
the central operator l = 0 and the bidders L = {1, . . . , |L|}. Let there be t types of power
supplies. These types can include control reserves (positive, negative, secondary, tertiary) and
power injections differentiated by their locations, durations, and scheduled times. The same type
of supplies from different bidders are perfect substitutes for the central operator. We assume that
each bidder l has a private true cost function cl : Xl → R+, where 0 ∈ Xl ⊆ Rt+ and cl(0) = 0. This
last assumption, cl(0) = 0, holds for many electricity markets, for instance, control reserve markets,
and day-ahead markets that include generators’ start-up costs [15,21]. Each bidder l then submits
a bid function to the central operator, denoted by bl : Xˆl → R+, where 0 ∈ Xˆl ⊆ Rt+ and bl(0) = 0.
As is discussed in [7, §3.1], these bid functions also capture the traditional multiple-item auction
setup.
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Given the bid profile B = {bl}l∈L, a mechanism defines an allocation rule x∗l (B) ∈ Xˆl and a
payment rule pl(B) ∈ R for each bidder l. In many electricity markets, the allocation is determined
by the economic dispatch, that is, minimizing the aggregate cost subject to some constraints
J(B) = min
x∈Xˆ,y
∑
l∈L
bl(xl) + d(x, y)
s.t. g(x, y) ≤ 0.
(1)
Here y ∈ Rp are variables entering (1) in addition to the allocation x ∈ Xˆ = ∏l∈L Xˆl. The
function d : Rt|L|+ × Rp → R is an additional cost term. For example, in the case of a two-stage
electricity market, y corresponds to the second stage variables and d is the second stage cost. The
function g : Rt|L|+ × Rp → Rq defines the constraints.1 Finally, if the problem is infeasible, the
objective is J(B) =∞.
Let the optimal solution be denoted by x∗(B) ∈ Xˆ and y∗(B) ∈ Rp+.2 The utility of bidder l is
ul(B) = pl(B)− cl(x∗l (B)).
A bidder whose bid is not accepted is not paid and ul(B) = 0. Then, the total payment of the
central operator is given by
u0(B) = −
∑
l∈L
pl(B)− d(x∗(B), y∗(B)),
which defines the utility of the central operator. Note that this payment can be an expected value
when the function d is an expected second stage cost.
Three fundamental properties we desire in mechanism design are individual rationality, efficiency
and dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility. A mechanism is individually rational if bidders do
not face negative utilities, ul(B) ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ L.3 A mechanism is efficient if the sum of all utilities∑|L|
l=0 ul(B) is maximized. This property is attained if we are solving for the optimal allocation of
the market in (1) under the condition that the bidders submitted their true costs.
To define dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility, we first bring in tools from game theory.
Let B−l denote the bid profile of all the bidders, except bidder l. The bid profile B is a Nash
equilibrium if for every bidder l, ul(Bl,B−l) ≥ ul(B˜l,B−l), ∀B˜l. The bid profile B is a dominant-
strategy Nash equilibrium if for every bidder l, ul(Bl, Bˆ−l) ≥ ul(B˜l, Bˆ−l), ∀B˜l, ∀Bˆ−l. Finally, a
mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) if the truthful bid profile C = {cl}l∈L
is the dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. In other words, every bidder finds it more profitable to
bid truthfully, regardless of what others bid.
2.1 Payment rules
The design of the payment rule plays a crucial role in attaining the desirable properties above.
We first consider two prominent payment rules widely used for the electricity markets, that is, the
pay-as-bid mechanism and the locational marginal pricing (LMP) mechanism.
Under the pay-as-bid mechanism, a rational bidder would overbid to ensure positive utility.
There exist many Nash equilibria, none of which are incentive-compatible [6]. Under the LMP
1Problem (1) defines a general class of markets, for example, energy and reserve markets [15, 22] and stochastic
markets [21,23].
2We assume that in case of multiple optima, there is some tie-breaking rule according to a predetermined fixed
ordering of the bidders.
3It is also often referred to as voluntary participation or cost recovery.
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mechanism, strategic manipulations become more complex than the case of the pay-as-bid mecha-
nism. A bidder can maximize its utility by both inflating the bids and withholding its maximum
supply [24]. Furthermore, an equilibrium may not even exist [25]. In summary, none of these
payment rules satisfy the properties of efficiency and incentive-compatibility.
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is characterized by the payment rule, pl(B) =
bl(x
∗
l (B))+(h(B−l)−J(B)). The function h(B−l) ∈ R must be carefully chosen to ensure individual
rationality. We use the Clarke pivot rule h(B−l) = J(B−l), where J(B−l) denotes the minimum
total cost without bidder l, that is, the optimal value of the optimization problem in (1) with
xl = 0.
4 Note that this mechanism is well-defined if a feasible solution exists when a bidder is
removed. This is not restrictive in the presence of many bidders and a second-stage market.
Our previous work in [7] shows that the VCG mechanism satisfies all three fundamental prop-
erties for the model introduced in (1). This result is a generalization of [11–13] which do not
consider continuous goods, second stage cost and general constraints. Dominant-strategy incentive-
compatibility makes it easier for bidders to enter the auction, without spending resources in com-
puting optimal bidding strategies.
Despite these remarkable theoretical virtues, the VCG mechanism can suffer from collusion and
shill bidding [16]. Bidders K ⊆ L are colluders if they obtain higher collective utility by changing
their bids from CK = {cl}l∈K to BK = {bl}l∈K . A bidder l is a shill bidder if there exists a set S and
bids BS = {bk}k∈S such that the bidder l finds participating with multiple bids BS more profitable
than participating with a single truthful bid Cl. These shortcomings are illustrated by electricity
market examples in [7, 14].
This observation motivates us to define coalition-proofness. By coalition-proof, we mean that
a group of bidders, who lose when bidding their true cost, cannot profit from collusion, and no
bidder can profit from bidding with multiple identities. We remark that it is not possible to
achieve immunity to collusion from all sets of bidders, see also the examples in [27]. For instance,
no mechanism can eliminate the case where all bidders inflate their bid prices simultaneously.
2.2 Core as a coalition-proof outcome
In coalitional game theory, the core defines the set of utilities that cannot be improved upon by
forming coalitions.5 We discuss how this concept coincides with coalition-proofness.
For every S ⊆ L, let J(BS) be the optimal value of (1) with x−S = 0, where the stacked vector
x−S ∈ Rt(|L|−|S|)+ is defined by omitting the subvectors from S. In particular, it is defined by the
following expression:
J(BS) = min
x,y
∑
l∈S
bl(xl) + d(x, y)
s.t. g(x, y) ≤ 0, x−S = 0.
Note that, this function is nonincreasing, J(BR) ≤ J(BS), for S ⊆ R. We refer to J as the market
objective. Then, the core Core(C) ∈ R× R|L|+ is defined as{
u ∈ R× R|L|+ |u0 +
∑
l∈L
ul = −J(C),
u0 +
∑
l∈S
ul ≥ −J(CS), ∀S ⊂ L
}
.
(2)
4This rule generates the minimum total payment by the central operator while ensuring individual rationality of
the bidders [26, Theorem 1].
5The utility allocation and the auction outcome are used interchangeably.
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The core is always nonempty in auctions because the outcome u0 = −J(C), ul = 0 for all l ∈ L
always lies in the core. Core outcomes are individually rational since they are restricted to the
nonnegative orthant for the bidders. The equality constraint in (2) implies that the outcomes are
efficient since the term on the right is maximized. We say that an outcome is unblocked if no set
of bidders can make a deal with the operator from which everyone can benefit. This condition is
ensured by the inequality constraints in the definition of the core.
As is outlined in auction literature [16] and extended to the market setup (1) in [7, Theorem 3],
the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof if and only if the VCG outcomes lie in the core. Hence, past
work considers characterizing bid curves and constraints such that the VCG outcome is guaranteed
to lie in the core. To state these results and extend beyond them, we bring in the definition of
supermodularity. For the following definitions, we use J(S) instead of J(BS) since the properties
are required to hold under any bid profile B. We denote the set-theoretic difference S \ {l} by S−l.
Definition 1 A function J : 2L → R is supermodular if J(S) − J(S−l) ≤ J(R) − J(R−l) for all
coalitions S ⊆ R ⊆ L and for each bidder l ∈ S. A function Jˆ : 2L → R is submodular if and only
if −Jˆ is supermodular.
For any set of bids, the VCG outcome is in the core if and only if the market objective J is
supermodular [7, Theorem 2]. Supermodularity of problem (1) is a strong condition which can only
be achieved in restricted settings, such as polymatroid-type constraints and convex bids [7, Theo-
rem 5]. Though the convex bid assumption may be reasonable in certain markets, the polymatroid
constraint requirement is stringent. In particular, DC-OPF problems involve polytopic constraints
and a polytope is in general not a polymatroid. In such instances, the market objective is gener-
ally not supermodular. As a result, the VCG mechanism suffers from collusion and shill bidding.
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any result bounding the profitability of such
manipulations, in case the objective function is not supermodular. Therefore, we aim to quantify
the coalition-proofness property of the VCG mechanism under more general bid functions and con-
straints. As a remark, all the following results hold for any general auction over continuous (or
discrete) goods with complex constraints.
3 Approximating Coalition-Proofness
For the results in this section, we are inspired by the growing literature on the submodularity
ratio [18, 19]. We first define the supermodularity ratio to quantify how close a set function is to
being supermodular. Using the supermodularity ratio, we then introduce the weak supermodularity
condition for the market objective in problem (1). Finally, we show that this condition indeed
provides us with an approximate coalition-proofness certificate for the VCG mechanism.
Definition 2 The supermodularity ratio of a nonnegative set function J : 2L → R+ is the largest
γsup such that
γsup
[∑
l∈K
J(S−l)− J(S)
]
≤ J(S−K)− J(S), ∀K,S ⊆ L.
In literature, submodularity ratio is defined to quantify how close a nonnegative set function is
to being submodular [18,19]. Since the function J is supermodular if and only if −J is submodular,
it may seem natural to use the submodularity ratio to describe how close −J is to being submodular.
However, submodularity ratio is only defined over nonnegative set functions. Even if we allow for
nonpositive functions, it does not provide any useful information for our purposes. In addition, this
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ratio can be zero in the cases where the supermodularity ratio is positive. As an alternative to the
submodularity ratio, previous studies also discuss curvature to quantify how close a nondecreasing
set function is to being supermodular. However, the objective in (1) is nonincreasing and curvature
is unbounded for nonincreasing set functions [18].
Motivated by the discussion above, we derive some important observations for the supermodu-
larity ratio of nonincreasing set functions.
Proposition 1 The following statements hold for a nonincreasing set function:
(i) γsup ∈ [0, 1],
(ii) this function is supermodular if and only if γsup = 1.
The proof of the proposition is relegated to the appendix. We define a set function to be weakly
supermodular if γsup > 0.
Next, we show that the weak supermodularity provides us with bounds on both shill bidding
and collusion, hence, we achieve approximate coalition-proofness.
Theorem 1 For the bidders L, consider a VCG mechanism modeled by (1). If the market objec-
tive J is weakly supermodular, then,
(i) A subset of bidders K ⊆ L who lose when bidding their true values cannot profit more than
[γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(C−K ,BK)],
by a joint deviation BK . For any joint deviation BK , this total profit is upper bounded by
[γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(C−K ,B0K)],
where the bid profile B0K is the set of bids bl(xl) = 0, ∀xl ∈ Xl, ∀l ∈ K.
(ii) For any bidder l, the profit from bidding with the set of bids BS is at most
[γ−1sup − 1][J(C−l)− J(C−l,BS)],
more than the profit from a single truthful bid Cl. For any set of bids BS, this value is upper
bounded by
[γ−1sup − 1][J(C−l)− J(C−l,B0l )],
where the bid B0l is given by bl(xl) = 0, ∀xl ∈ Xl.
Proof (i) Let K be a set of colluders who would lose the auction when bidding their true values
CK = {cl}l∈K , while bidding BK = {bl}l∈K they become winners, that is, they are all allocated
a positive quantity. We then define C = (C−K , CK) and B = (C−K ,BK) where C−K = {cl}l∈L\K
denotes the bidding profile of the remaining bidders. The profile C−K is not necessarily a truthful
profile. The total VCG utility that colluders receive under B, ∑l∈K uVCGl (B), is
=
∑
l∈K
J(B−l)− J(B) + bl(x∗l (B))− cl(x∗l (B))
6
≤ γ−1sup[J(B−K)− J(B)] +
∑
l∈K
bl(x
∗
l (B))− cl(x∗l (B))
= [γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(B)] + J(C)−
[ ∑
l∈L\K
cl(x
∗
l (B)) +
∑
l∈K
bl(x
∗
l (B)) + d(x∗(B), y∗(B))
]
+
[∑
l∈K
bl(x
∗
l (B))− cl(x∗l (B))
]
= [γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(B)] + J(C)−
[∑
l∈L
cl(x
∗
l (B)) + d(x∗(B), y∗(B))
]
≤ [γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(B)]
≤ [γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(C−K ,B0K)].
The first equality follows from the VCG payments. The first inequality follows from the weak
supermodularity. The second equality comes from the fact that K was a group of losers, so
J(B−K) = J(C−K) = J(C). We also add and subtract the term [J(C) − J(B)]. After substitut-
ing these, we see that the term in brackets is the cost of C but evaluated at a feasible suboptimal
allocation (x∗(B), y∗(B)). Then, the second inequality follows from the fact that the term in the
brackets is lower bounded by J(C). This yields the first statement. Finally, the third inequality
is obtained from J(C−K ,B0K) ≤ J(B). This holds since x∗(B) is a feasible suboptimal solution to
J(C−K ,B0K). This concludes the proof of part (i).
(ii) Similar to part (i), define C = (C−l, Cl). The profile C−l is not necessarily a truthful profile.
Shill bids of bidder l are given by BS = {bk}k∈S. We define a merged bid B˜l as
b˜l(xl) = min
xk∈Xˆk, ∀k
∑
k∈S
bk(xk) s.t.
∑
k∈S
xk = xl.
We then define B˜ = (C−l, B˜l). The VCG utility obtained from shill bidding under B = (C−l,BS),∑
k∈S u
VCG
k (B), is
=
∑
k∈S
[J(B−k)− J(B) + bk(x∗k(B))]− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
≤ γ−1sup[J(B−S)− J(B)] +
∑
k∈S
bk(x
∗
k(B))− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
= γ−1sup[J(C−l)− J(B˜)] + b˜l(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))− cl(
∑
k∈S
x∗k(B))
= [γ−1sup − 1][J(C−l)− J(B˜)] + uVCGl (B˜)
≤ [γ−1sup − 1][J(C−l)− J(C−l,BS)] + uVCGl (C)
≤ [γ−1sup − 1][J(C−l)− J(C−l,B0l )] + uVCGl (C).
The first inequality follows from the weak supermodularity of J . The second equality holds since we
have J(B˜) = J(B). This follows from the definition of the merged bid and the following implication.
Since the same type of supplies are perfect substitutes for the central operator, the functions g and
d in fact depend on
∑
l∈L xl. The third equality follows from adding and subtracting the term
[J(C−l) − J(B˜)]. The second inequality is the DSIC property of the VCG mechanism. This yields
the first statement. Finally, the third inequality is obtained from J(C−l,B0l ) ≤ J(B˜) = J(C−l,BS).
This holds since x∗(B˜) is a feasible suboptimal solution to the problem defined by J(C−l,B0l ). This
concludes the proof of part (ii). 
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Theorem 1 provides the first bounds on the profitability of collusion and shill bidding for
the cases when the outcome of the VCG mechanism is not in the core. In summary, as the
supermodularity ratio gets larger, the function J gets closer to being supermodular, and we obtain
tighter bounds on the profitability of collusion and shill bidding. Furthermore, if γsup = 1, we
obtain exact coalition-proofness. As is proven in Proposition 1-(ii), this result coincides with the
one on supermodularity in [7, Theorem 3]. In practice, achieving the profit in Theorem 1 may still
be difficult since in general, the bidders need full information on the market constraints and other
bidders to collude optimally.
Following from these discussions, a natural question is whether the function J in (1) satisfies
weak supermodularity.
Theorem 2 The market objective J in (1) is weakly supermodular. Its supermodularity ratio
satisfies γsup ≥ 1/kfeas > 0, where kfeas is the maximum number of bidders that can be removed
while ensuring the feasibility of (1).
Proof For supermodularity ratio, we aim to derive the tightest lower bound on
J(S−K)− J(S)∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S)
,
for all K,S ⊆ L. There are four possible cases to consider.
(1) If J(S−K)− J(S) = 0 and
∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) = 0, then, for this instance, the supermod-
ularity ratio is 1.
(2) The case where we have J(S−K)− J(S) > 0 and
∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) = 0 can be ignored,
since we are looking for a lower bound.
(3) Consider the case of
∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) > 0 but J(S−K)− J(S) = 0. We show that this
can never be the case for the model in (1). Since the market objective is nonincreasing we have
J(R) ≤ J(S) for S ⊆ R. Then,
J(S−K) ≥ J(S−l) ≥ J(S),
for all l ∈ K and K,S ⊆ L. As a result, we obtain J(S−K) ≥ J(S−l) ≥ J(S−K), or equivalently
J(S−K) = J(S−l). This observation yields∑
l∈K
J(S−l)− J(S) =
∑
l∈K
J(S−K)− J(S) = 0,
which contradicts the initial assumption.
(4) Finally, we consider the case of J(S−K)− J(S) > 0 and
∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) > 0. This
yields a positive lower bound on the supermodularity ratio. Note that if J(S−l) is infeasible, so is
J(S−K). Hence, we can ignore such infeasible sets for computing a lower bound. Restricting our
attention to the case of J(S−K)− J(S) > 0 and
∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) > 0, a lower bound on γsup
is given by
γsup = min
S,K⊆L
|K|≤kfeas
J(S−K)− J(S)∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S)
8
≥ min
S,K⊆L
w∈K, |K|≤kfeas
J(S−K)− J(S)
|K|[J(S−w)− J(S)]
≥ min
S,K⊆L
w∈K, |K|≤kfeas
J(S−w)− J(S)
|K|[J(S−w)− J(S)]
=
1
kfeas
> 0.
The equality follows from ignoring infeasible sets. The first inequality follows from w yielding the
maximum value for J(S−l) − J(S), over l ∈ K. The second inequality comes from J(S−K) ≥
J(S−w). Since
∑
l∈K J(S−l)− J(S) > 0 and w yields the maximum, we have J(S−w)− J(S) > 0.
We obtain the final equality. This concludes the proof. 
Theorem 2 shows that any electricity market auction modeled by (1) is weakly supermodular,
and its supermodularity ratio is lower bounded by 1/kfeas ≥ 1/|L| > 0. Furthermore, we obtain
γsup = 1 if the problem (1) is infeasible whenever any two bidders are removed. This can be
regarded as an alternative proof to [7, Proposition 1]. However, the lower bound we derived is
often conservative. In Section 4, we obtain larger supermodularity ratios from studies based on
realistic electricity market instances. In the numerics, we also discuss a computationally efficient
method for computing the supermodularity ratio.
It is worth mentioning the previous research on lower bounding the submodularity ratio. The
work in [20] lower bounds the submodularity ratio of an unconstrained optimization problem using
restricted strong convexity and restricted smoothness of the objective function. These bounds on
submodularity ratio can potentially carry over to the supermodularity ratio of an unconstrained
problem. By contrast, we consider a constrained problem, and hence their results do not extend to
the supermodularity ratio of problem (1).
In summary, the VCG mechanism satisfies the approximate coalition-proofness property for
the electricity markets modeled by (1). Subsequently, we can provide bounds on the profitability
of collusion and shill bidding. In addition, better approximate coalition-proofness properties are
achieved if the market objective J is close to being supermodular.
4 Numerical Results
Our goal is to show the effectiveness of the supermodularity ratio to predict collusion potential
in electricity markets. We start by providing a simple example to show that the upper bound
in Theorem 1 and the lower bound in Theorem 2 are attained. Then, we consider IEEE test
systems with DC power flow models. These markets do not satisfy the stringent conditions for
supermodularity when line limits are present. We calculate the supermodularity ratios of these
systems and show that they are close to 1. Consequently, we obtain tight bounds on collusion and
shill bidding.
Before discussing the numerical results, we explain the computation method for the supermod-
ularity ratio in Definition 2. To calculate γsup, we need to solve up to 2
|L| instances of the market
problem (1) and then we could form the following linear program with up to 22|L| linear constraints,
γsup = arg max
γ
γ
s.t. γ
[∑
l∈K
J(BS\l)− J(BS)
]
≤ J(BS\K)− J(BS),
(3)
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for all K,S ⊆ L. To deal with the exponential size, we use the constraint generation approach
proposed in [28]. The method proceeds as follows. We initialize the algorithm by setting γsup = 1.
For this candidate solution, we can formulate another problem that finds the constraint in (3) with
the largest violation, that is, the largest γsup[
∑
l∈K J(BS\l)− J(BS)]− [J(BS\K)− J(BS)]. For this
formulation, we refer to [7]. We then obtain another candidate solution by finding the largest ratio
that satisfies this violated constraint. The algorithm iterates between two problems and converges
to the supermodularity ratio [28, Theorem 4.2]. This algorithm may still require the generation of
all constraints, but in practice, it converges fast. Note that, this problem also needs to be solved
under all bid profiles. We tackle this by solving (3) for many randomly generated bid profiles and
setting the supermodularity ratio as the minimum of these ratios.
4.1 A simple example for Theorems 1 and 2
Let  be a small positive number. Suppose the central operator has to procure 800 MW of power
supply from bidders 1, 2 and 3 who have the true costs $600 for 800 MW, $300 +  for 400 MW
and $300 +  for 400 MW, respectively. Under the VCG mechanism, the dominant-strategy Nash
equilibrium is truthful bidding. Hence, assume all the bidders are truthful. As a result, bidder 1
wins and receives pVCG1 = 600 + (600 + 2 − 600) = $600 + 2. Invoking Theorem 2, we obtain
the lower bound γsup ≥ 1/2 since kfeas = 2. In fact, this lower bound is tight. We can verify that
the supermodularity ratio of this market is given by γsup = 1/2 by evaluating the constraints in
Definition 2 under any set of bid prices.
Now, suppose bidders 2 and 3 collude and change their bids to $0 for 400 MW. Then, bidders 2
and 3 win and receive a payment of $600 each. The total VCG utility they receive is $600− 2. In
this case, the upper bound in Theorem 1 is tight since [γ−1sup − 1][J(C)− J(C−K ,B0K)] = [1/(1/2)−
1][600− 0] = $600. For this example, we highlight that, for bidders 2 and 3, lowering bid prices to
zero results in the largest profit these bidders can achieve by collusion. However, in general, it is
not straightforward how to optimally collude since the bidders do not have full information on the
market constraints and other bidders.
4.2 IEEE test systems with DC power flow models
In wholesale electricity markets, the central operator’s problem involves a power grid model with
network balance constraints. In this section, we adopt the DC power flow model [8]. This model
assumes lossless lines, constant bus voltages, and small phase angle differences. Under the LMP
mechanism, the generators may act strategically to manipulate the payments in these markets [9,10].
The works in [7, 15] proposed the VCG mechanism as a way to handle this issue. However, these
markets have quadratic bids and polytopic constraints. Even though the bid curves are convex,
the polytopic constraint set of a DC power flow is not a polymatroid whenever the line limits are
present. For this reason, the VCG mechanism can suffer from collusion and shill bidding [7].
Here, we consider the IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, and 118-bus test systems in [29]. In [7, §5.2], we
analyzed the VCG payments and how they compare with the payments for the LMP and the pay-as-
bid mechanisms. In this work, we focus on the supermodularity ratio to quantify coalition-proofness
of each system. To identify the collusion potential under any market instance, the supermodularity
ratio computations are further verified by choosing the coefficients of the quadratic bids from a
uniform distribution.
For the 14-bus example, we have 10 MW limits on lines exiting node 1 and connecting it to
nodes 2 and 5. Even though the bids are convex, the polytopic constraint set is not a polymatroid
and conditions for supermodularity do not hold. Invoking Theorem 2 we obtain a lower bound
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γsup ≥ 1/2 since kfeas = 2. In contrast, the estimated supermodularity ratio, calculated using the
constraint generation approach discussed above, is 0.76. Next, we consider the bid curves in [29].
Since all bidders are allocated a positive quantity, we add two losing bidders at nodes 1 and 5.
The supermodularity ratio indicates that losing bidder’s collective profit from collusion would be
upper bounded by $1296, which is 11% of the total VCG payment. Similar bounds are obtained
for other possible colluders. We conclude that Theorem 1 provides us with bounds on strategic
manipulations.
Similarly, the 30-bus system also has polytopic constraints and the conditions for supermod-
ularity do not hold. By contrast, we calculated the supermodularity ratio to be 1. This verifies
the exact coalition-proofness of the 30-bus system under the VCG mechanism. This result can be
explained in two ways. First, none of the line limits are tight at the optimal solution. Second,
removing two bidders yields an infeasible problem in most cases.
In the case of the 118-bus system, the constraint set is a polymatroid because there are no
line limits in the model [29]. It follows that the market objective is supermodular [7, Theorem 5].
Additionally, supermodularity ratio is calculated to be 1, as is proven in Proposition 1-(ii). For the
bid curves in [29], there are two losing generators located at nodes 1 and 4. Suppose these two losing
generators form a coalition and lower their bids to zero. Then, their collective profit decreases from
$0 to −$439.8. Invoking Theorem 1, collusion is not profitable for any set of colluders who lose
when bidding their true costs. As a final remark, we fix 50 MW limits on two lines, one connecting
nodes 5 and 6, another connecting nodes 9 and 10. Then, the supermodularity ratio is calculated
to be 0.92. This shows that we can obtain weak supermodularity by introducing line limits, similar
to the 14-bus system.
5 Conclusion
For the electricity markets, the incentive-compatible VCG mechanism was susceptible to collusion
and shill bidding since the market objective was in general not supermodular. Motivated by this,
we defined the supermodularity ratio to quantify how close a set function is to being supermodular.
The supermodularity ratio of the market objective provided us with bounds on the profitability of
collusion and shill bidding. These bounds get tighter as the ratio increases. We then derived an
analytical lower bound on the supermodularity ratio of the electricity markets. The results derived
apply to general auctions run by the VCG mechanism. By quantifying coalition-proofness, we can
evaluate the applicability of the VCG mechanism in terms of collusion and shill bidding. Finally,
we illustrated the tightness of the bounds on supermodularity ratio, and verified our results with
case studies based on the IEEE test systems.
Our future work will address deriving bounds on collusion and shill bidding for double-sided
auctions using the idea introduced here.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof For a nonincreasing set function, we prove the statements in Proposition 1.
(i) Since the function is nonincreasing, we observe that both sides of the equation are always
nonnegative in Definition 2. Since γsup is the largest scalar, we have γsup ≥ 0. Furthermore,
the inequality must hold when K is a singleton. Then, we obtain γsup ≤ 1.
(ii) The set function is supermodular if and only if the supermodularity ratio is given by γsup = 1.
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(=⇒) We first prove that supermodularity implies γsup = 1. Let K = {l1, . . . , lk}. Notice
that, by supermodularity,
J(S−li)− J(S) ≤ J(S−{li,...,lk})− J(S−{li+1,...,lk}).
Thus, we have
∑
l∈K
J(S−l)− J(S) =
k∑
i=1
J(S−li)− J(S)
≤
k∑
i=1
J(S−{li,...,lk})− J(S−{li+1,...,lk})
= J(S−K)− J(S).
The first equality follows from the definition of the set K. Supermodularity implies the in-
equality. The last equality holds by a telescoping sum. Finally, the same arguments can be
made for all K,S ⊆ L. Since the supermodularity ratio is the largest scalar such that this
inequality holds, we obtain γsup ≥ 1. Combining it with γsup ≤ 1 from part (i), we obtain
γsup = 1.
(⇐=) To prove that the supermodularity is also necessary for γsup = 1, we proceed by contra-
diction. Suppose supermodularity does not hold. Then, there exist sets S ⊆ R, and l ∈ S such
that J(R−l)−J(R)> J(S−l)−J(S). First, we show that without loss of generality, we can
restrict R to differ from S by one bidder, that is, R = S ∪ {i} for some i. We take S0 = S
and Sj = Sj−1 ∪ {lj} with Sk = R, then,
k∑
j=1
J(Sj−l)− J(Sj−1−l ) = J(R−l)− J(S−l)
> J(R)− J(S)
=
k∑
j=1
J(Sj)− J(Sj−1).
The strict inequality above must hold for one of the summands, that is, ∃j, J(Sj−l)−J(Sj−1−l ) >
J(Sj) − J(Sj−1). Equivalently, ∃j, J(Sj−l) − J(Sj) > J(Sj−1−l ) − J(Sj−1). Hence, we can
consider sets S ⊆ R that differ only by bidder i. By this observation, we have
J(R−l)− J(R) > J(S−l)− J(S)
= J(R−{i,l})− J(R−i)
≥ 0,
(4)
for i ∈ R \ S. Considering the set R, and K = {i, l}, we have:∑
l′∈K
J(R−l′)− J(R) =J(R−l)− J(R) + J(R−i)− J(R)
>J(R−{i,l})− J(R−i) + J(R−i)− J(R)
=J(R−K)− J(R).
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The strict inequality follows from (4). If the supermodularity ratio was γsup = 1, then the
inequality in Definition 2 would be violated for this particular choice of R,K ⊆ L. Hence, the
supermodularity ratio is γsup < 1. Thus, we conclude that the supermodularity condition is
also necessary for γsup = 1.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1. 
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